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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
'YEYHEH CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

COX CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., and UNITED STATES
FIDELITY AND GUARANTY
COMPANY,
Defendants and Appellants.

ll353

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants in their Statement of Facts have selected
particular exhibits, portions of the testimony and summaries of evidence, most favorable to the appellants'
contentions, rather than stating the facts, as they must
be viewed on appeal, objectively supporting the Verdict and Findings. Thus the following corrections must
be noted.
1

1. Contrary to the statements on pages 5 and 0 of

appellants' Brief the sequence of the events concerning
the agreements between Cox and Western Steel and
Cox and "\Veyher occurred as follows:
(a) The Prime Contractor bids were opened
by the State Road Commission December 21 and
Cox was the low bidder (Ex. 51 ) .

( b) Sometime prior to December 23 representatives of Western Steel Company contacted Cox
about the steel. They arrived at a verbal under·
standing on or about December 23 that Western
would receive the order for structural steel for the
project. (R. 223, Ex. 36) The terms of delivery
of the steel had been requested by Mr. Cox and
were placed in the Proposal. (R. 225) The scheduling and final completion date for the steel work
under the Proposal were determined after nego·
tiations with Mr. Cox. (R. 227)
( c) On December 27 Western Steel ordered
some of the steel items from Bethlehem Steel Com·
pany. ( R. 223, Ex. 37)
( d) On January 6 Cox was notified of the
award of the Prime Contract with the State. (Ex.
64, R. 357) The steel was to have been furnished
and installed by 'Vestern Steel by June 30, 1966

(Ex. 36)
( e) On January IO in the evening, Robert Y
'Veyher met with _M.:r. Cox at Manti· to nego t'1ate
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the \V eyher subcontract. At that time W eyher
was informed that Cox had already entered into
a contract with Western Steel and that he had
ordered the steel from them on January 10 in his
office at .Manti. (R. 81) Weyher informed Cox
that he couldn't finish on June 30 if the steel was
also being finished on June 30, since \Veyher's
work would have to be performed after \Vestern
Steel Company had finished. (R. 81-84) Cox thereupon stated that he had already ordered the steel
from \Vestern Steel but that he wanted Mr. Weyher to coordinate and schedule it. ~Ir. Cox also
stated that he had already told Western Steel of
the sequence in which he wanted the steel installed.
(R. 271-27 4)
(f) Cox and Weyher jointly phoned Western
Steelat thattime to see if the steel could be delivered
earlier. No assurance was given that it could, but
that an effort would be made to have it delivered
earlier. (R. 272, Ex. 46) The Weyher subcontract
had already been typed up and prepared for Mr.
\V eyher' s signature before he arrived on January
10. It was then signed. (R. 269, Ex. 2)
(g) Thereafter on March 2, 1966, in response
to a request from Ron Cox and to a letter from
Cox dated February 16, 1966, Western Steel submitted a revised schedule of deliveries indicating
that fabrication would be completed by the end
of June. ( R. 225, Ex. 22) A copy of this letter
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was sent to 'Veyher, since by this time 'Veyher
had contacted 'Vestern Steel several times relating
to scheduling the steel onto the project. 'Veyher
objected to this rescheduling by letter <lated .March
4, (Ex. 23) wherein he informed Cox of the fact
that this would delay the project.
( h) On January 11 Western Steel had received back the signed agreement between Western
and Cox and indicated in an interoffice memorandmn that the steel would have to be delivered
by June 15 is possible. (R. 235, Ex. 46).
(i) The March 2 letter indicates a mill sched·
ule shipment date, which places final installation
later than .June 30. (Ex. 22)
2. The W eyher subcontract required W eyher to
commence January 15 and complete by June 30. (Ex.
2) Cox received a notice from the State dated January
12 requiring it to commence work by January 22,
(R. 47, Ex. 12, 13) and Cox did not commence work
until January 21, 1966. (R. 47)
3. Contrary to pages 7 and 8 of the appellants'

Brief, steps 9, 10, 11 and 12 did not follow the forming and pouring of the concrete work. Cox began laying
gravel in April and extended it throughout the entire
project until late August. (R. 457-459, Ex. 69, Ex.
l) The asphalting began in July and extended through·
out August, September and October. (Ex. 69) Cox
in bidding the project did not have any particular order
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for undertaking his work and had no schedule. (R.
355-3.56 (Steps 5, 6, 7 and 8 set forth on pages 7 and
ti of appellants' Brief, commencing with the erection
of steel by Western Steel on May 28 were completed
with the final placing of the curb and parapet on October 7. ( R. 106-110, Ex. 28) 'l'he steps 1 through 8,
however, were necessary in the order shown. These
steps beginning with finishing the pile cut-off by Raymond Concrete Pile Co. and extending through final
exca\'ation to the placing of concrete column caps began
February 15 and extended through March 22. \Veyher
was not able to commence its first work of forming
until February 15. (R. 101-106, Ex. 27)
4. The \V estern Steel structural steel had to be

fabricated and thereafter erected on the project before
the State Road Commission could establish the final
finish grade. \V eyher could not commence its work until
these two steps had been completed on any particular
structure. (Ex. 28, R. 107) Western Steel began delirery of its steel to the project on the westbound 14th
Street railroad structure on May 24 and delivered its
last steel to the project at Forest Street structure
over I-15 on August 18. (Exs. 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and
H) The steel was erected in place beginning on the
14th Street westbound railroad bridge on June 20 and
on the last of the six bridges at Forest Street on August
29. (Ex. 28) After sending the .March 2 letter, Western
Steel had no further complaint from Cox (R. 227)
11ntil August 9 at which time Cox notified \V estern
Steel it was in default under its contract. (Ex. 38,
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R. 231) On December 8, 1967, Cox paid the final retention to 'Vestern Steel, except for a partial payment
still owing. (Ex. 45)

"r

"r

5. After 'Vestern Steel and Cox had consummated

their agreement,
estern became aware of
eyher
as a subcontractor. ( R. 234) and received calls from
'Veyher from time to time relative to expected <lelivery
dates of different items of steel. These contacts related
to coordination. (R. 244) Had the steel been delivered
on time, 1Veyher would have been able to finish. However, the failure to deliver and install the steel prevented
him from working. Even after the steel came, the
1Veyher performance extended over a longer period of
time than was anticipated because the steel delinry
was spread out over a substantially longer period of
time than should have been the case. It began May
24 and was finally delfrered August 24 and finally
erected on August 29. ( R. 88, 89, Ex. 28) The contracting for and ordering of the steel had already been
done by Cox so that 'Veyher had no opportunity to
do any of this ordering. (R. 279, 281, Ex. 22) (R. 2!2)
(R. 222, 234, Ex. 36)
6. Contrarv to the statements at pages 9 and JO,

Cox, when he bid the job to the State, had no definite
idea about when the asphalt or gravel was going to be
placed in surfacing the roadway. (R. 355, 356) At
the time be entered into the subcontracts with "' erher.
'Vestern Steel and Gilmore, he did not know when
the project would start since he had not received the
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notice to proced from the State. ( R. 360) l\'lr. Cox had
no schedule of how the work was going to proceed.
(R. :361) The only dates were those to which he held
Western Steel and Gilmore Steel to complete their
work, to""wit: June 30. (R. 362, 363) Contrary to
appellants' argument at page 10 of their Brief, Cox
commenced his work on the surfacing without regard
to the degree of completion of any of the structures.
He began laying gravel on 14th Street in April before
the first steel was even delivered to the job site, (R. 457,
Ex. 6) and continued until the last of August. The
gravel was placed first on April 1, along the Interstate portion; in early June along 14th Street beginning at the east end where it intersects with Highway
89 and moving on '¥est; ( R. 455) in July and on into
August on 14th Street, on the D-line at Forest Street
and along the R-line at Highway 30 where it goes
under the Freeway. (Ex. 6) The asphalt commenced
about July 11 (R. 461) on the Interstate and worked
on through July 29 and August 17 through 19 it was
placed up and down 14th Street south; then August
8 through August 28 the main portions of the Interstate
were surfaced and around August 24 the ramps and
bridge approaches were surfaced. (R. 461-463, Ex.
72) Cox did not have to come back to the project but
was at the project at all times. It was not necessary to
leave space one to two hundred feet on either side of
the structures. (R. 503) The bridge construction had
no effect on the asphalt at 14th Street and Highway
89 and Cox performed this work later on in the project.
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He did not have to come back because he was la ·
.
'Ying
all the other material at this time. (R. 518, 519). The
Forest Street approaches were performed by Fife bu[
they included substantially more than just the short
distance on either side of the structure. ( R. 486) Cox's
main asphalting operation was carried on during J ulr
and August and during this time he was workin~
throughout the project on all phases of it both graveling
and asphalting. ( Exs. 12, 13, and 69) ( R. 495-503,
Exs. 71-72)
7. There were no extra costs incurred by Cox due
to delays in completing its work. Having started in
April Mr. Cox worked on through the project when·
ever his equipment was on the project. (Exs. 6, 71, 72)
8. Contrary to the last statement on page 12 relat·

ing to the notice of claim, notice was given of the claim
because of the structural steel problem. (Exs. 16, 17,
18, 22, 23 and 48) (R. 261) Article 16 of the subcon·
tract does not relate to any delays but only those delays ,
by the owner's agent suspending the prosecution of the ·
work. (Ex. 2)

ARGUMENT
Appellants in their Brief raise two general ques·
tions: (a) Was the evidence sufficient to support the
Court's Findings of Fact and the jury's answers to the
Special Interrogatories; and (b) did the Court com· .
· g1vmg
· ·
th e I ns t rue t'10ns l· The ·
mit prejudicial error 111
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above questions relate to the award of damages for delays and will be discussed in the above sequence.
POINT I

THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
The evidence must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the jury's answers. Burkhalter v. Grandeur Homes, 17 Utah 2d 278, 409 P. 2d 614; Smith v.
Gallegos, 16 Utah 2d 344, 400 P. 2d 570; and Gordon
v. Provo City, 15 Utah 2d 287, 391 P. 2d 430. As stated
by the Court in Gordon, it will not disturb the jury's
finding,
"So long as it is supported by substantial evidence, that is evidence which, together with the
fair inferences that may be drawn therefrom,
reasonable minds could conclude as the jury
did .... "
As indicated in preface to respondent's Statement
of Facts, appellants have not presented the evidence
in an objective manner but have picked out portions of
the testimony and evidence most favorable to appellants' position. Therefore, with reference to the particular findings questioned by appellants beginning on
page 25 of appellants' Brief the following comments
are submitted to show there is sufficient evidence to
support the verdict and Findings of Fact. Since appellants have taken excerpts from some of the Findings,
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and attacked them piecemeal, appellants' questioned
Findings will be considered under the complete finding
designated by paragraph number.
A. FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 2 IS SUP. ,
PORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL En.
DENCE.

I.
Appellants claim, at page 25 of their Brief, that
the following finding is not supported by the evidence.
"That Cox entered into a contract with \Vestern Steel Company on January 10, 1966, after
having ordered certain structural steel from '
Western Steel prior thereto ..."
!

On December 23, 1965 Western Steel submitted ,
its Proposal and Agreement to furnish the steel on the
project. (R. 222, Ex. 36) Mr. Howard Jensen testi- ,
fied in connection with this Proposal as follows:
"Q. Going back to December, 1965, about December 23, did you have any contact with Cox
after you sent this proposal to him?
A. Our fabricated sales engineer, Mr. Lew
Kimball, had contact with Mr. Cox in bringing
this to a conclusion.
Q. At about in December of '65 did you haYe
occasion to undertake any orders or obtain an)'
orders or send any orders with reference to steel
on your proposal?
A. Well, at the time we made up this proposal
on December 23, I think we had a verbal under·
standing that we would be awarded this job anrl
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that we would proceed on it, and I believe it was
on December 27 when we entered an order with
Bethlehem Steel Company for some of the more
critical items as far as delivery is concerned, to
get this project underway. I think we had contacted them and found out what some of their
rollings on steel were and decided it was urgent
that we enter and order as soon as possible to obtain a booking on their orders in their mill." (R.
222 and 223)
"Q. Now, Mr. Jensen, after you had this contract with Cox when did you first have any schedule of the delivery of the steel to the project made
up?

A. Well, we had been asked by Mr. Cox to
meet a certain schedule that he desired to meet
on his project, and I think that the terms of that
were substantially put into this proposal." (R.
225)
' An order was given to Bethlehem Steel for some of
the items, December 27. (R. 224, Ex. 37)
On January IO, in the evening, when Robert Weyher and Cecil Cox met to discuss the signing of the CoxWeyher subcontract. This conversation occurred:
"Q. Did you have any discussion at that time
with him with reference to ordering this steel?

A. Yes.
Q. Can you give us that conversation?

A. Well, when I arrived Mr. Cox had the subcontract, which we both signed, for the work on
the concrete work, prepared. He prepared it in
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his office, I presume. At least he had it prepared
to submit to me for my signature, and as I reviewed it I noted the provision in there in regard 1
to the steel, and as I was not buying the steel nor
did I know what arrangements had been made
with either of the steel suppliers, Gilmore Steel
for the reinforcing steel or \Vestern Steel for the
structural steel, I inquired of him as to what
arrangements and with whom he had made these
arrangements.
Q. And what did he say?

A. And Mr. Cox told me that there were agreements with both of these steel suppliers for the
furnishing and erection of the steel and he would
handle that item, he would pay for it, he would
buy it from them, and that they would have 1t
there in sufficient time for me to do my work.
But he merely wanted me to schedule and co·
ordinate the delivery of the steel so that when we
were in need of it the steel contractors, both Gil·
more and 'Vestern, would have sufficient notice
so that they could get it to the job on time so we
wouldn't lose any time." (R. 81 and 82)
On cross examination Mr. \V eyher stated:
"Q. All right now, what else was included in
the discussion?

A. We talked about the contract that Mr. Cox
told me he had with 'Vestern Steel for the de·
livery of the structural steel.
Q. As a matter of fact he told you that ~e h~d
a bid proposal from them and let you see 1t, did
he not?
A. No, that's not my recollection.
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Q. Didn't he tell you that he was not going to
let this subcontract to you unless you would take
the responsibility for the delivery of the structural steel?
A. He certainly did not.
Q. And didn't you call Mr. Kimball of Western Steel to confirm the delivery?
A. Mr. Cox and I both called Western Steel."
( R. 271 and 272)

*

*

*

"Q. We'll get into your recollection on that in
a few minutes. Now you say that it is not your
recollection that Cox told you that he would not
let this subcontract to you unless you would agree
to be responsible for the delivery of the structural
steel?

A. Well, I certainly did not agree. I agreed to
coordinate the scheduling of the structural steel
and the reinforcing steel, and that I did." (R.
273)

*

*

*

"Q. And what was the occasion then for your
calling Mr. Kimball?
A. Because Mr. Cox told me that he'd entered
into a contract with Western Steel and that they
had agreed to get it all there by June 30.

Q. Isn't it a fact that Cox told you he would not
buy that steel from Western Steel until you had
entered info the subcontract and agreed to take
the responsibility?

A. No, sir." (R. 274)

*

*

*
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"Q. As a matter of fact, Mr. W eyher, you :
agreed to take the responsibility for the delivery
from \Vestern Steel, and that's why you called
Kimball ; isn't that a fact ?

A. No. l agreed to schedule and coordinate de.
livery so that it would fit in with the concrete
work.

Q. And why did you call Kimball?
A. Well, I started to tell you and I'll try again.
I called Mr. Kimball - Mr. Cox and I both
called him.

Q. Do you remember that? You were both on
two phones?
A. I don't know whether I was on the phone
all of the time alone or whether Mr. Cox was on
the phone part of the time with me or whether
Mr. Cox was not on the phone at all. I do recall
that later Mr. Lew Kimball, who we called, made
a note that said that both of us called him." (R
274 and 275)
Again in answer to a question of l\'lr. Piercey regarding
the subcontract Mr. W eyher testified,
"Q. Yes, and that says more than scheduling, '
doesn't it? It says, 'responsible for ordering the
steel and making sure it gets there on time so as
not to delay the subcontractor's performance.' '

A. Well, in your interpretation it becomes an
impossible condition, because it was already or·
dered by somebody else." (R. 279)
Mr. Cox, in discussing the \Vestern Steel com·
pletion date, testified:
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"Q. RighU Then so far as Western Steel is
concerned, how did you fix the time that Western
Steel was to perform? According to their agreement also?

A. No, I told Western Steel that they had to
be through with their work by June 30.
Q. You didn't have any beginning date for
Western Steel?
A. I don't think it showed a beginning date.
They just had to have their work done. They had
to have the supplies in on the job and finished
by a certain time.

Q. By June 30?
A. Yeah.

Q. And that was the important date so far as
'"estern Steel was concerned, June 30; is that
correct?
A. Well, I don't know what they call important dates.
Q. Well, what did you call the important date?
A. That was an important date for me." (R.

362)

Cox's statement to this effect is also found in the
Western Steel Memorandum. (R. 235, Ex. 46) There
would seem therefore substantial evidence to support
the finding that sometime prior to January 10 Cox
and \V estern Steel had an arrangement sufficiently
solid to warrant Western Steel ordering from Bethlehem Steel. There is also sufficient evidence to show
that prior to the signing of the Cox-W eyher Subcon-
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I

tract, Cox had already entered into his agreement with
Western Steel; that W eyher relied upon Cox through
\Vestern Steel to get the steel to the job site in time
for W eyher to finish by June 30; and that \Veyhei
would not have signed and thus bound himself under
the subcontract to finish by June 30 if that had not
been the case. It is not reasonable to infer from these
facts that Cox, having made the arrangements with
Western Steel as to June 30, completion date, and
then claiming to leave everything up to W eyher, would
nevertheless have signed the Western Steel agreement
after signing W eyher' s agreement. There could be no reliance upon W eyher in that respect since W eyher could
not do his work until Western Steel's work was finished. The reliance claimed by Cox works backwards
and is without reason.

2.
Appellants claim at page 26 of their Brief that
there is no evidence to support the finding,
'' ... that thereafter on or about March 2, 1966,
\Vestern Steel Company and Cox without Weyher' s consent modified the said steel agreement
... and did further modify the schedule of fabri;,
cation, delivery and installation of the steel · · ·
After negotiations in December, between Western
Steel and Cox, resulting in the informal agreement
between them and the ordering of some preliminarv
items of steel, the delivering and scheduling of the
items had been agreed to. Thereafter on January IO

16

I

[

I
;

'
'

Cox affixed liis signature to the Proposal to which he

Jia<l previously agreed and to which he had previousiy
ad<leJ some typed agreements. Thereafter a letter was
sent from \Vestern Steel to Cox dated March 2, (Ex.
2~) concerning which .Mr. Howard Jensen of Western
Steel testified as follows:
"Q. N °''"• Mr. Jensen, after you had this contract with Cox when did you first have any schedule of the delivery of the steel to the project made
up?

A. Well, we had been asked by Mr. Cox to
meet a certain schedule that he desired to meet
on his project, and I think that the terms of that
were substantially put into this proposal.
Q. After you had entered into this proposal
then did you have occasion to communicate with
Cox regarding the scheduling of the steel 1
A. At at later period I think Ronnie Cox had
gotten in touch with us regarding scheduling,
and I believe - well, now, there's a letter that I
wrote to him in response to his call to us. I presume that's the one you have.

Q. I'll show you what's been marked in this
case heretofore as exhibit 22, which is a copy of
a letter dated March 2, addressed to Cox from
"\V estern Steel, and ask you if you can identify
that for us.
A. That's the letter that was written on March
second when we outlined to him what kind of
commitments we felt we had on the mills for deliYery of steel, and where we told him the order in
which we had understood that these were to be
delivered, and -" (R. 225 and 226, Ex. 22)
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Mr. Jensen further testified in answer to Mr
Piercey's question about whether 'iV eyher, later on:
had contacted him to expedite the Forest Street bridge:
"A. I can't remember if he did, but if he'd done
rd have had to tell him it was in vain, because we
had this absolutely scheduled, our shipments from
the mill in a certain order, and I think we at the
beginning of this job made a statement that after
we set the schedule up it would have to be followed." (R. 239)

3.
Appellants claim at page 29 of their Brief that
there is no evidence to support the finding:
". . . that Cox was informed of the modified
delivery and fabrication schedule by \Vestern
Steel and made no objection thereto thus agreeing to and permitting the steel to be delivered
and erected subsequent to June 30, 1966 .... "
The letter from Western Steel to Cox is not only
in response to inquiries from Ronnie Cox (R. 225)
but was in response to a letter from Cox dated Feb·
ruary 16, which letter is mentioned in the first line.
(Ex. 22) Thus the evidence is simply this: In response
to a request from Cox orally made and in further response to a written request of February 16, both requests following on the heels of the execution of the
agreement between Western Steel and Cox, Western
Steel in compliance with the request sets forth its
schedule for mill deliveries of the steel for the different
portions of the project. Mr. Jensen of Western Steel
testified:
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"Q. Now I notice that - let's see. The schedule that appears on this letter of March 2, 1966,
indicates the order of delivery to different bridges
on the project. As I understand, that was pursuant to a request of Cox, is that true?

A. I think when we first negotiated this contract we decided the order of delivery. I can't
remember whether that was - whether the order
of delivery was made at our suggestion. It seems
to me it was. We told him it would be more convenient for us to get certain work out. But anyway it was agreeable to the parties and it never
became a question of controversy in here from
then on, to the best of my knowledge." (R. 226
and 227)
It is reasonable to infer that Cox agreed to the
new schedule. If not and if it intended to hold Western
Steel to its original contract completion date, it would
have made and should have made some objection to
this new schedule. Just as reasonably we must assume
that if Cox intended on holding Wey her to his June 30
date, notwithstanding this change in steel schedule,
there would have been some duty to respond to the
March 2 letter. Just as obviously there should reasonably have been some duty on the part of Cox to respond
to Weyher's letter of March 4, (Ex. 23) in which
\Yeyher objected to this new schedule of Western Steel.
The jury and the Court are both certainly entitled to
reasonably infer that there was an agreement by Cox
for the extension of the steel schedule and there was
an agreeement or at least a recognition by Cox that
Weyher would not be held to the June 30 date.
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Appellants seem to contend that once Cox signer!
the proposal and agreement with Western Steel he had
no further responsibility or even any interest in the
performance of \Vestern Steel. This does not appear
to be reasonable when the following is considered:
(a) The importance of scheduling the com·
pletion of each subcontractor's work. (R. 362-36.f)
(b) The contact by Ron Cox and the letter
of February 16, inferentially asking for a commitment on the delivery of the steel. ( R. 225-227,
Ex. 22)
( c) The letter dated August 9, 1966, addressed to Western Steel asking 'Vestern to spee<l
up, which is in the same form as is a letter to Weyher Construction Company. ( Exs. 38 and 48)
( d) The payment of $340,000.00 to Western
Steel. (R. 368)
( e) The payment on December 8, 1967, and
letter of transmittal indicating the contractual
relationship and concern of Cox. (Ex. 45)
(f) The inclusion of Western Steel amongst
the other subcontractors under a designation of
specialty company in a letter requesting an increase
in the prequalification. (Ex. 68, R. 450)
(g) The obvious reference in a letter dated
August 30 written to other subcontractors to keep
ahead of the operation so as to not delay with the
oiling. (Ex. 50)
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ll. FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 3 IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

I.
Appellants contend at page 30 that there is no evidence to support the finding,
"That Cox having ordered the steel and having
agreed with Western Steel to the delayed schedule made it impossible for W eyher to order the
steel. ... "
Appellants state at page 31,
"It is uncontested that plaintiff knew at the
time it signed the subcontract agreement with
Cox that Cox was going to enter into a purchase
agreement with Western Steel. ... "

Such an alleged fact certainly is contested. At the time
Weyher signed the Cox subcontract he had been informed by Cox and knew that Cox had already entered
into the agreement with Western Steel. This prior
Western Steel agreement prompted W eyher and Cox
to discuss the effect upon Weyher's work of the simultaneous completion dates of June 30 and resulted in
a telephone call to Western Steel to see whether or not
the delivery date could be accelerated. ( R. 81-84) It
is obvious that the steel had already been ordered by
Western Steel and W eyher could thus not do anything
more than coordinate or schedule the steel.

Mr. Weyher testified in response to questions by

Mr. Piercey:
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"Q. Now tell me what you did between January the tenth and May the 24th with lVestern
Steel with respect to being responsible for order
ing the steel and making sure the steel items will
be taken care of in plenty of time so as not tu
delay the contract.

A. I didn't order it, because it was impossible.
It had already been ordered by Mr. Cox.
Q. Now, as a matter of fact it had not been
ordered until concurrently with the signing of
this subcontract; is that correct?

A. You talked about January -

Q. The tenth.
A. Until some future date, and surely it must
have been ordered then, and I responded correct·
ly I think.
Q. All right, go ahead and tell me what you
did with respect to ordering and making sure the
steel items would be taken care of in plenty of
time so as not to delay the contract.
A. I didn't do anything in regard to the order·
ing.

Q. And you didn't do anything with regard to
making sure they were delivered in time so as
not to delay the contract either, I take it?

A. Yes. I tried to schedule it and I urged them
to hurry if they could, because I pointed out we
needed to do our work, but I had no control over
them, I had no contractual relationship with
them.
Q. But as a matter of fact you had assumed the
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responsibility under this contract with Cox, hadn't you?

A. No, I had not." (R. 281 and 282)
The coordinating and scheduling, however, was
in turn rendered impossible by Western Steel's schedule of March 2. (Ex. 22) W eyher did all it could to
coordinate the placing of the steel which is the usual
pattern followed in the construction of this type of
work. \Veyher commenced attempting to coordinate
the delivery of the steel after the Cox-Western Steel
contract was consummated. (R. 234, 244, 263)
It is highly improbable for a jury or court to assume
that Cox would obligate itself with Western Steel for
$340,000.00 upon an agreement to furnish and install
steel by June 30, and have no responsibility thereunder.
Neither the court or jury made such an unreasonable
inference.

2.
Appellants claim at pages 31 and 32, that there is
no evidence to support the fallowing:
" ... that Cox interfered with Weyher's work
and thus prevented \Veyher from performing under the terms of the subcontract by June 30,
1966 ... and that Cox had ordered the steel and
by so ordering and agreeing to the new scheduling interfered with and made it impossible for
\V eyher to comply.... "
The evidence in support of this finding has been

23

fairly adequately either summarized or set out in some
detail heretofore. Again it should be noted, however:
(a) Cox had, prior to his meeting with Wey.
her, agreed with Wes tern Steel on the terms ~f
the steel contract, including the June 30 date,
had prepared and had typed thereon said terms
for delivery of steel.
( b) Cox had already prepared and typed rn
the subcontract for "\-Veyher including page 11
before W eyher met on the evening of January 10.
( c) The ordering of the steel by Cox to be
completed by June 30 had already occurred.
( d) Because of the conflict in the two June ·
30 dates and also the Gilmore Steel June 30 date,
they telephoned Western Steel to determine
whether or not the June 30 completion date could
be moved ahead by two weeks, and this possible
acceleration of the ordering and delivery of the
steel was indicated by Western Steel.
( e) In reliance upon the very obvious fact
that the steel had to be completed in sufficient
time prior to his completion date for him to prop·
erly do his work, W eyher undertook its subcou·
tract agreement with Cox.
Appellants persist throughout their Brief in erro·
neously arguing upon the basis that the Cox-\Vestern
Steel agreement was "going to be entered into" at the
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time that \Veyher signed his subcontract and that the
initial purchase from Western Steel constitutes the
interference with Weyher's work. Such argument does
not go to the actual question of interference. The interfere nee arises out of the contract between Cox and
Western Steel, it is true. However, it is based upon
the subsequent failure of Cox and \V estern Steel to
adhere to the original contract requirements and by
modifying said original completion date of June 30
through the March 2 letter (Ex. 22) and through subsequent delays even beyond those contemplated in said
letter. It is this interference which the jury and the
Court reasonably infers is not the responsibility of
Weyher but actually is under the primary responsibility
of Cox, and which forced Weyher into the delay, extending into November.
The provisions of the said contract upon which
appellants rely in regard to the structural steel delay
must be given meaning in the context of the entire subcontract agreement and in relationship to the circumstances surrounding the development of the delay.
When Mr. Cox first took bids on these structures, he
contemplated that a subcontractor M. Morrin & Sons
would do the entire structure including furnishing of
all steel. Under this concept, (R. 316) obviously such
a paragraph would have materiality. And such a paragraph had been typed up for signature prior to Mr.
Weyher's arrival. However, since Mr. Weyher had
not proposed to do the steel, and since Cox undertook
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the steel work through Western, '"eyher very properlv
questioned this paragraph, and particularly the co~
pletion date of June 30.
It is obvious that such a paragraph relates to the
actual purchasing and contracting for the structural
steel. That paragraph reasonably goes to the very terms
which Cox believed were so important, i.e., the price
and the completion date of June 30. (R. 364) Therefore, at the time W eyher came into the picture the
structual steel had already been purchased and ordered
and it was to be completed on that project by June 30.
This work was part of the work which Cox had origi·
nally contemplated that M. Morrin & Sons would do
under a complete subcontract, including both steel and
concrete.

1

1

The only meaning which can be attached to the
paragraph, if it has any meaning in view of the prior
agreement between Cox and Western Steel, would be
to coordinate the steel to the different and particular
portions of the contract work as those portions became
available. This coordination, as W eyher and Jensen
testified, is the ordinary type of coordination. However.
such coordination obviously must be within the frame·
work of the contract between the general contractor
and the supplier, to-wit: Cox and Western. Even that '
type of coordinating and scheduling was taken away
from W eyher by the March 2 letter from 'Vestern
Steel to Cox in which the detailed scheduling of the
steel to the different portions of the contract work was
1

1
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set out. The only thing left for \V eyher to do after
tl1al was to continually call Western Steel to try to
hurry up the delivery and installation of steel in an
effort to determine at what point \V eyher could commence the different operations on the different structures which followed installation of the steel.
In other words, according to the strict wording
of the subcontract paragraph in question, Weyher
could not be responsible for ordering the steel and making sure that the steel items were taken care if in view
of the contract between Cox and Western Steel with
the subsequent amendment to that contract which came
into effect by the .March 2 letter and thereafter. Weyher
did all he could to expedite the steel but as Exhibit
22 shows and as Mr. Jensen testified (R. 239) :
" ... it was in vain because we had this absolutely scheduled, our shipments from the mill in
a certain order, and I think we at the beginning
of this job made a statement that after we set
the schedule up it would have to be followed."
The contract had already been established between
Cox and \Vestern Steel and had already been modified
by Cox and Western Steel, over W eyher' s objection.
(Ex. 23)
Both parties therefore knew at the time that
Weyher entered into the subcontract with this provision
included therein, that Cox had already purchased the
steel, had already established the June 30 completion
date of Western Steel, and by conference and joint
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telephone call had determined that "\Vestern Steel would
have the steel finished prior to that June 30 completion
date. Thereafter on March 2, after W eyher had com- .
menced the contract to subject W eyher to a modification
in the structural steel delivery date over Weyher's
objection and classifys it as Weyher's responsibilitv
seems unreasonable to say the least. The evidence do;1
not support such an inference and the jury was justified
in finding to the contrary. The Court in Findings of
Fact No. 3 properly determined that Cox had made
it impossible for W eyher to comply with this provision
of the subcontract.
!

C. THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE
SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS AND
ARE CORRECT UNDER THE LAW OF
THE CASE

1

1

At pages 34 and 35 of their Brief, appellants argue
that the Conclusion of Law No. I is not supported by
the evidence. The facts supporting this conclusion have
been set forth above by referring to different portions '
of the testimony and to the various exhibits. We have
shown heretofore that there was substantial evidence
to support the jury's verdict and the court's Findings ;
of Fact to the effect that Cox interfered with the per· :
formance of W eyher' s contract. The conclusion there·
fore indicates the legal result caused by the interfer·
ence. Such an interfernce gives rise to a cause of action
on the part of Weyher.
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"As a general rule, if a contractor agrees to do
certain work within a specified time, and he is
prevented from performing the contract by the
act or default of the other party, or by the acts of
persons for whose conduct the latter is responsible, the delay thus occasioned is excused, and the
contractor may not be held liable.... " 13 Am.
J ur. 2d page 51. See also Peter Kiewit Sons
Company v. Pasadena City Junior College District, 379 P. 2d 18 (Calif.) ; and the annotation
at 16 ALR 3rd 1252.
The Courts are in accord with the general principle of law that a provision in a construction contract
relieving a contractee from liability for delays is not
applicable to delays caused by the conduct of the contractee constituting active interference with the performance of the contractor. See Psaty and Fuhrman
t•.Housing Authority, 68 A. 2d 32 (R.I. 1949), annotated in IO A.L.R. 2d page 805. The question of which
party to a construction contract is responsible for a
delay in completion is a question of fact for the determination of the trier of the facts. 13 Am. J ur. 2d page
!

119.

POINT II

1

THE FINDING OF THE JURY THAT COX
WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DELAY IN
THE DELIVERY OF THE STRUCTURAL
STEEL IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
The matters submitted to the jury in Question 1
la), l (b) and 1 (c) involve the factual determination
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as to why the delays occurred and whose responsibilih
they were. The Court then applied said factual findin;,
b
to the contract provisions, as it had indicated it would
throughout the trial, and supplemented the jury'i
answers by its own findings. Thereafter Conclusions
of Law were made applying the factual determinationi
to the law of the case and, of course, to the contract
document itself. 'J-'he instruction requested by appe].
lants to the effect that the subcontract provision shouhl
have been given to the jury is unnecessary. The jury
was well aware of the provisions of the subcontract.
Throughout the record are found ample references
thereto by witnesses, counsel and the Court. The appL·
cation of the contract provisions to various legal de·
fenses asserted by appellants was properly considered
by the Court in making its own Findings of Fact. Con·
clusions of Law and Judgment.

POINT III
IT WAS PROPER TO FIND THAT PLAIN·
TIFF WAS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES FOR
DELAY IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,226.85
The matters complained of by appellants under
Point III involve the legal interpretation of the various
contractual provisions and are not proper subject matter
of instructions to the jury. The various contract articles
are discussed below to indicate the lack of any legal
effect upon the issues herein.
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A.. ARTICLE
TRACTS.

IX -

OTHER

SUBCON-

Such a contractual provision is no defense to the
contractor. "No damage" clauses are very often placed
in construction contracts. However, if they are included
m contracts,
". . . they are construed strictly, because of
the harsh results which may flow from their enforcement. A delay which extends for so long ;i,
time that it may be regarded as an abandonment
will subject the contractee to liability. Moreover,
even though a particular delay may fall within
the literal meaning of such a provision, the provision will not be enforced if the delay is a result
of fraud or active interference on the part of the
one seeking the benefit of the provision." (Emphasis added) 13 Am. Jur. 2d p. 55, 56.

In this case the paragraph must be construed strictly.
The paragraph does not excuse the contractor from
responsibility for the acts or operations of itself, but
only for the acts of other subcontractors or material
suppliers. Thus strictly construed, the clause says
nothing about delays or interferences by the Contractor.
However, even if it did by its strict interpretation
absolve the contractor from the responsibility for delay,
nevertheless where Cox has actively agreed to and participated in the cause of the delay, he cannot be permitted to take advantage of this exculpatory clause. In
discussing exculpatory clauses this Court in Union
Pacific Railroad Company v. El Paso, 17 Utah 2d 255,
408 P. 2d 910, has stated:
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" ... th~t the 4}w does not look with favor up 011
one exactmg a covenant to relieve himself of the
basic duty which the law imposes on everyone:
that of using due care for the safety of himse]I
and others."
'
The Court also comments on some basic contract prin.
ciples which should be considered in resolving a dispu!e
about ~uch provisions in a contract. The Court said',
"The first is that each party is entitled to assume that the other intends to conduct himsell
as a reasonable and prudent person would under
whatever circumstances may thereafter arise,
which presupposes that he will commit no wrong·
ful act nor be guilty of negligence."
This Court further indicates that the provisions must!
be taken in context with the other provisions of the.
subcontract. Certainly it cannot be considered to apply
where the contractor, Cox, modified its subcontract
with Western Steel.
B. ARTICLE XIV - CLAIMS FOR EXTRA
WORK OR DAMAGES
The Court properly held that adequate notice of
claims under this clause was given to Cox. As soon as
W eyher learned that the Cox-Western Steel contract '
was being changed through the March 2 letter (Ex.
22) W eyher within two days objected thereto and
notified Cox of the delay. (Ex. 23) Thereafter on
August 9 (Ex. 48) "\i\T eyher returned a Cox Construe·
ti on Company letter noting on the bottom thereof'
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"\Ve are on schedule, we have sufficient forces
on the job to keep up with the erection of the
structural steel which is being furnished and installed by you and is not a part of our contract.
Delivery of this steel has materially delayed our
work. The strike is June also caused some delay."
This Court in Utah State Building Board v. W a"lsh
Plurnbing, 16 Utah 2d 249, 399 P. 2d 141, held that
the failure to give notice, where a contract requires
notice is not fatal.
"In this connection it should be kept in mind
that where a contract such as this requires the
giving a notice, unless the failure to give it in
some way puts a party to a disadvantage or adversely affects his rights, he should not be permitted to evade his just obligations under the contract because of a mere technical failure to give
notice."
C. ARTICLE XV - BASIS AND SCOPE OF
PAYMENT.
The application of this prov1s1on in the subcontract has no factual foundation in the testimony whatsoever. There was never any contention made throughout the trial that full and final payment of the contract
price precluded the claim for damages. As a matter
of fact, it is admitted that the contract price was never
fully paid to W eyher. (Ex. 26, R. 97) In any event,
eYen had full and final payment been made on the
contract such payment does not preclude a suit for
breach of contract.
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..
D. ARTICLE XVI - DELAYS.
Appellants have quoted this Article of the suo.
contract out of context. A reading of the entire Artick
shows that the delays referred to therein are tho~~
caused by the owner or owner's agent. The precedin~
portion of the Article, which appellants have not quoteu
reads as fallows :
"It is understood and agreed that the Subcon.
tractor shall comply with the instructions given
by the Owner or Owner's agent, including an:· ·
instructions requiring him to delay or suspend .
the prosecution or completion of the work pro·
vided for herein, and that the Subcontractor will
not ... "
It is obvious therefore that Article XVI has no 1
application to the issues at hand. There is no contention :
nor evidence to the effect that the owner-the State
Road Commission ordered any suspension of work.

POINT IV
THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY
WERE PROPER
Under Rule 49 the Court may submit to the jury
written interrogatories and in so doing shall give to the
jury such explanation and instruction concerning the
matter as may be necessary to enable the jury to make
its findings upon each issue.
"If in so doing the Court omits any issue 01
fact raised by the pleadings or by the evidence.
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each party waives his right to a trial by jury of
the issues so omitted unless before the jury retires he demands its submission to the jury. As to
an issue omitted without such demand the Court
may make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall
be deemed to have made a finding in accord with
the judgment on a special Yerdict." (Rule 49
URCP)

The Court obviously submitted to the jury some
\ery specific questions. All of the other questions concerning issues of fact and issues of law were reserved
and were made the subject of rather extensive Findings
11f Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment entered by
the Court. There was no attempt on the part of the
Court or of counsel to attempt to submit to the jury
all of the mixed questions of law and fact which may
: have been implicit in the various defenses raised by each
party. There was no demand made that all of the issues
be submitted to the jury.
This Court has stated in Robinson v. H reinson,
17 Utah 2d 261, 409 P. 2d 121, that,
"The parties have had what they were entitled
to: a full and fair opportunity to present their
contentions and the evidence supporting them to
the Court and jury. When this has been done all
presumptions are in favor of the validity of the
verdict and judgment."
Appellants claim that the instructions did not
fairly present defendants' theory of the case to the jury.
Both the plaintiff's claims and the defendants' claim on
its Counterclaim are summarized by the Court in In-
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struction No. 5. Such a summary of the pleadings b ·
proper. Taylor v. Weber County, 4 Utah 2d 328, 2%
P. 2d 925. The basic issue relating to delays is even] 1
and fairly set forth in the Instruction No. 1, questio1;,
1 (a) , 1 ( b) and 1 ( c), without reference to names ul
either party. There is a further Instruction No. l(A,
which indicates the possible answers but in turn inrilt:
counsel to discuss the respective theories of the ca~t
The Instruction further invites the jury to ask que1.
tions, if necessary. The Special Interrogatories begin·
ning with No. 2 (a) relate to the particular damage
claims being asserted by the plaintiff. Appellants rai~e
no question as to the verdict of the jury or the findings
of the Court relative to the Interrogatories No. !, :
through No. 7 ( b) and the jury recommendations. Thui !I
there can be no prejudical error now claimed by appel· i
lants in regard to those Interrogatories.
Appellants claim prejudicial error in not giving :
defendants' requested Instruction No. I. Defendants
requested Instruction No. 1 is in effect a judgrnen\
in favor of defendants as a matter of law upon the
theory that no evidence was adduced in favor of plain·
tiff's case. As the record shows and as we have pointeJ
out in this Brief there was substantial evidence to sup .
port the jury's Verdict and the Court's Findings am! ,
Conclusions and Judgment.
Appellants further complain that Instruction Nu
2 should have been given. It is interesting to note tli(
all inclusive manner in which appellants requested 3
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great number of instructions merely by reference to
numbers under the JIFU. One must surely recognize
that Judge Jones did not give the great number of
instructions which many judges do give. However,
the instructions when considered as a whole adequately
inform the jury of the questions to be answered. The
instructions further define the burden of proof and a
fair preponderance of the evidence in Instruction No.
~ (R. 612) There is nothing in the record to indicate
that the jury was misinformed or that it did not understand its function in answering these questions. Counsel
had ample opportunity to argue all phases of the case
and, of course, did so.
Whichever issues the jury did not decide the Court
did decide in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Judgment which were much more comprehensive
than is the usual case where matters have been submitted
to a jury.
Specific mention is made by appellants of the Instruction No. 5 as being demonstrative of the prejudicial presentation of the claims of the parties. It is
obvious, however, that most of the claims in the lawsuit
were those of the plaintiff and Instruction No. 5 merely
listed the various claims and the amounts being sought
thereunder. Said statement of the claims would appear
to be more prejudicial to the plaintiff, in that it made
no mention whatsoever of the contract moneys being
withheld by Cox which contract moneys in the amount
nf $26,000.00 were a substantial item in the plaintiff's
case.
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"The question here involved is whether tti
case was presented to the jury in such a mann t
that it is rea~onable to believe that the parties h:J'
an opportumty to present their evidence and hai·e
a fair and impartial trial by the Court and jurr
~~ that r~sult has been accomplished irregula;.
1hes or mmor errors should be disregarded. }{e.
versal of a judgment is justified only when tlitn
is some error of such a substantial nature that
there is a likelihood that the result would hare
been different in its absence." Eager v. Willi.i
17 Utah 2d 314, 410 P. 2d 1003.
.

The comprehensive coverage of this case by botn 1
parties cannot be questioned. The record is voluminotb
as is the number and content of the exhibits. All of the
evidence which both parties attempted to put in wa1
received and considered by the Court and jury.
Throughout the trial many references were made by
the Court and by counsel to the contract documents ana 1
to the issues involved. Extensive argument was had. 1,
although it is not reported as part of the record. Appel·,
lants put on much evidence relating to the allegeo,
delays to Cox's work and to alleged damages suffered,
by Cox. The Court and the jury after considering sucli '
claims found them to have no merit. Respondent'
'Veyher, put on extensive evidence relative to dela!
1
and to the damages suffered. The Court and jury found
merit in only some of the damages of plaintiff but diJ
find merit in the plaintiff's position as to the delayi
The jury did come back in one instance to ask a ques·
tion but were satisfied in all other respects. Appellanb
I
have shown nothing which would indicate any reversai
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rnnld have resulted if different Instructions had been
given, The Instructions although brief were more than
adequate when considered in light of the extensive evidence and argument which was presented throughout
the trial.
1

SUMMARY
Appellants seek relief in this case upon three grounds,
none of which can be supported by the record. There
is nothing to indicate, either in the record or in appellants' Brief, that W eyher could be liable to Cox for the
claimed delay. Furthermore, appellants have not taken
issue with the determination by the Court and jury
that Cox's claim for delay and damages is untenable.
The Court and jury considered appellants' claim for
costs and found no merit therein. To grant a further
hearing under Point III of appellants' claimed relief
u1 order to determine the amount of damage suffered
by Cox would be contrary to the Findings of the Court,
and appellants in this case have not questioned the
determination by the Court that Cox's claim is unfounded.
All three Points upon which appellants rely, howeYer, are sufficiently laid at rest by answering the two
questions affirmatively: (a) Was the evidence sufficient to support the jury's findings; and (b) were the
Instructions given properly so that prejudicial error
was not committed by the Court? 'Ve believe that the
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record fully supports the jury's answers to the Special
Interrogatories and the Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment. Respondent respect.
fully petitions this Court that the jury's Special Verdict
the Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment be affirmed.

I

Respectfully submitted,
CLYDE, MECHAM & PRATT

By -···-··-····························--···-·
Elliott Lee Pratt
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent
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